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The Challenge of Convincing Ethical Prosecutors 
That Their Profession Has a Brady Problem 
Adam M. Gershowitz*
Abstract 
In recent decades, both the media and legal scholars have 
documented the widespread problem of prosecutors failing to disclose 
favorable evidence to the defense—so called Brady violations.  Despite all 
of this documentation, many ethical prosecutors reject the notion that the 
criminal justice system has a Brady problem.  These prosecutors—ethical 
lawyers who themselves have not been accused of misconduct—believe 
that the scope of the Brady problem is exaggerated.  Why do ethical 
prosecutors downplay the evidence that some of their colleagues have 
committed serious errors? 
This essay, in honor of Professor Bennett Gershman, points to what 
psychologists have termed social identity theory and ingroup bias.  Under 
these concepts, people derive part of their identity and self-esteem from 
membership in social groups.  When someone from the group is accused 
of misconduct, members of the ingroup are psychologically less able to 
recognize or accept that a group member has committed the misconduct. 
Social scientists have documented this phenomenon in children, sports 
fans, Democrats, Republicans, racial groups, and warring religious 
factions. 
Ethical prosecutors are also likely susceptible to ingroup bias and 
therefore probably find it more difficult than the average person to 
acknowledge that individuals from their group have engaged in Brady 
violations.  This is particularly true given the nature of the Brady doctrine, 
which is an amorphous test that requires judgment calls in close cases. 
Ingroup bias does not mean that prosecutors as a group are unethical, but 
simply that they are susceptible to the same types of psychological errors 
as members of other groups.  This paper applies social identity theory and 
the concept of ingroup bias to prosecutors and offers some modest 
suggestions for helping ethical prosecutors to recognize and respond to 
the Brady problem. 
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Professor of Law, William &
Mary Law School.  I am grateful to Elizabeth Brightwell and Fred Dingledy for exceptional research 
assistance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
More than a dozen years ago, I moderated a symposium panel about Brady v. 
Maryland1 that featured Bennett Gershman.  The symposium audience consisted of 
students, professors, and, most notably for purposes of this paper, prosecutors. 
Professor Gershman pointed out that Brady had failed as a discovery doctrine 
because, even though there are many Brady violations, it is exceedingly difficult to 
discover them.  And even when Brady violations are unearthed, courts often do not 
reverse convictions.  Professor Gershman thus concluded that “it is readily apparent 
that Brady violations are among the most pervasive and recurring types of 
prosecutorial violations” and that “[n]umerous studies have documented widespread 
and egregious Brady violations.”2 
Multiple prosecutors in the audience responded with hostility to Professor 
Gershman’s presentation.  One prosecutor angrily raised his voice and expressed 
outrage that Professor Gershman had suggested that prosecutors as a group were 
unethical.  But Professor Gershman had done no such thing.  He had simply pointed 
out some basic facts: (1) there are a considerable number of Brady violations; (2) 
those violations have been widespread in some offices; and (3) innocent defendants 
have been convicted because of Brady violations.  Professor Gershman never 
suggested that all prosecutors were engaged in misconduct, and he certainly never 
suggested that the particular prosecutors in the audience had engaged in misconduct. 
The prosecutor in the audience nevertheless acted as though he had been personally 
attacked and seemed unable to acknowledge the existence of Brady problems in the 
criminal justice system. 
What should we make of this story?  Perhaps it was an isolated incident. 
Perhaps most prosecutors recognize that some of their colleagues have committed 
misconduct.  Certainly, Professor Gershman and other scholars have chronicled 
more than enough prosecutorial misconduct to make the entire criminal justice 
system aware that Brady problems exist.3  Yet, I do not think the prosecutor’s hostile 
response to Professor Gershman’s presentation was an isolated instance.4  Rather, 
1   373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
2   Here I quote from the subsequent law review article Professor Gershman contributed to the 
symposium.  Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 688 
(2006). 
3   Professor Gershman’s treatises are required reading for scholars in both the ethics and 
criminal procedure fields and they are geared not only to academics but to lawyers as well.  See 
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2d ed. 1999); BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,
CRIMINAL TRIAL ERROR AND MISCONDUCT (3d ed. 2015). 
4   As Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky has explained: 
Prosecutors believe that the problem of prosecutorial misconduct is overstated. . . . 
[P]rosecutors believe that (1) meritless claims of prosecutorial misconduct have become a
standard defense tactic; (2) they face misperceptions and negative images of their activities
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because prosecutors are part of a tight-knit group, there is reason to believe their 
group identity makes it more difficult for them to appreciate wrongdoing by 
members of their group.5  Psychologists call this phenomenon social identity theory 
and ingroup bias. 
Social identity theory posits that people define themselves and improve their 
self-esteem based on their group memberships.6  To the extent that a person’s social 
group is seen positively, the individual’s self-esteem also improves.  Put differently, 
the better a person’s social group is perceived, the better the person feels about 
themselves.  This, in turn, opens the door to ingroup bias.  People tend to attribute 
success of their group or group members to merit or hard work.  By contrast, there 
is a tendency to attribute failure or misconduct by the group or group members to 
external factors or to downplay the existence of those failures or misconduct.7  When 
a group member behaves poorly, others in the group may have a tendency to protect 
the group (and thus their own self esteem) by finding another explanation for the 
poor behavior or by discounting the existence of the misconduct altogether. 
This essay aims to make a small addition to the burgeoning literature about the 
psychology of prosecutorial behavior.  In doing so, I do not intend to be more critical 
of prosecutors than of the average citizen though.  As I have written elsewhere, I 
believe the vast majority of prosecutors are ethical, over-worked public servants8 
and that a large amount of prosecutorial misconduct is in fact accidental.9  At the 
same time, the belief that most prosecutors are hard-working, well-intentioned, and 
ethical does not mean that there are not widespread Brady violations in the criminal 
justice system.  This essay aims to explain how simultaneously (1) there can be 
widespread Brady problems throughout the United States, and (2) ethical 
prosecutors can fail to recognize the scope of the Brady problem.  The article points 
to social identity theory and ingroup bias as part of the explanation. 
in the media, such as charges that “prosecutors feel that [they] are above the law”; and (3) 
it is incorrect to assume that they are not subject to professional discipline. 
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 
8 UDC L. REV. 275, 292–93 (2005); see also Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial 
Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 60 (2016) (quoting a prominent prosecutor as saying 
that prosecutorial misconduct is “more episodic than epidemic”).  Recently, a federal prosecutor argued 
that “prosecutorial misconduct occurs with admirable infrequency.”  See Timothy C. Harker, Faithful 
Execution: The Persistent Myth of Widespread Prosecutorial Misconduct, 85 TENN. L. REV. 847, 850 
(2018). 
5 Professor David Harris has made this point with respect to police.  DAVID A. HARRIS, FAILED 
EVIDENCE: WHY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESISTS SCIENCE 11, 106 (2012). 
6 See infra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 43–68 and accompanying text. 
8 See Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive 
Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261, 261 (2011). 
9 See id. at 263. 
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Part II of this essay recounts the well-known fact that there are a lot of Brady 
violations throughout the United States.  Part III then explores the language—a 
language of fault—that we use to discuss those Brady violations.  Part IV then delves 
into the social science literature on social identity theory and ingroup bias.  In 
particular, Part IV explores studies and data about children, sports fans, Republicans, 
Democrats, racial groups, and rival religious groups to demonstrate that when an 
individual perceives criticism of someone in their group that they are less willing to 
accept objective evidence.  Part V then considers some ways in which we can 
approach the discussion of Brady violations to make it more likely for prosecutors 
to appreciate the scope of the Brady problem. 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE BRADY PROBLEM
It is difficult to know how many Brady violations are committed by prosecutors 
each year.10  Scholars typically cite to major studies by newspapers, nonprofits, and 
academics.  For instance, the Chicago Tribune reviewed 11,000 homicide 
convictions between 1963 and 1999 and found that courts reversed 381 cases for 
Brady violations.11  In 2003, the Center for Public Integrity reviewed more than 
11,000 appellate decisions that involved claims of prosecutorial misconduct and 
found that more than 2,000 cases involved reversible errors, the majority of which 
were Brady violations.12  A Pittsburgh Gazette study of 1,500 cases found numerous 
Brady violations.13  The Northern California Innocence Project documented dozens 
of Brady violations in California courts between 1997 and 2009.14  In an earlier 
paper, I found that more than two-dozen death penalty cases were reversed for Brady 
violations between 1997 and 2007.15  Indeed, in his landmark study on capital 
10  See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure 
Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943, 1945 (2010) (“Brady is a hidden problem 
for which it is impossible to gather accurate data.”). 
11  See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999. 
12   See Steve Weinburg, Breaking The Rules: Who Suffers When a Prosecutor is Cited for 
Misconduct, The Center For Public Integrity (June 26, 2003), 
https://publicintegrity.org/accountability/breaking-the-rules/ (last updated May 19, 2014). 
13  See Bill Moushey, Win at All Costs: Hiding the Facts, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 
1998. 
14  See KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA INNOCENCE PROJECT 
37 (2010), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ncippubs. 
15  See Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1076 (2009). 
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reversals, Professor James Liebman found that Brady violations were the most 
common reversible error in death penalty cases.16 
While these studies show a widespread Brady problem, they offer an 
incomplete picture and actually understate the problem.17  Many Brady violations 
never come to light because it is by definition very difficult to unearth evidence that 
prosecutors never provided to defendants.  Moreover, most studies of Brady 
violations principally focus on deliberate prosecutorial misconduct.  Newspapers 
and reform organizations draw our attention to prosecutors who actively hide 
evidence and recidivist Brady violators.18  These cases are sensational and 
outrageous.  But, of course, the problem goes further because a prosecutor can 
commit a Brady violation accidentally.19  A prosecutor runs afoul of Brady by failing 
to turn over favorable evidence that is material.  Multiple scholars have observed 
that it is quite difficult for prosecutors, who are looking at a case from the 
prosecution’s perspective with the belief that a defendant is guilty, to easily see all 
of the evidence that a defendant might use to show he is innocent.20 
Moreover, favorable evidence includes not just exculpatory evidence but also 
impeachment material.  Ethical prosecutors may not recognize impeachment 
evidence staring them in the face.  For instance, imagine a domestic violence case 
in which it is obvious that the victim was beaten by her husband.  As too often 
occurs, the victim initially denies that her husband hit her.21  After talking with 
investigators though, she eventually acknowledges that her husband was the 
16  See JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-
1995 ii (2000). 
17  See Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute Prosecutorial 
Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 513 (2011) (“The failure to discover prosecutorial misconduct is 
especially likely in cases of Brady violations.”). 
18  See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
19  The prosecutor need not have a culpable mental state to commit a Brady violation.  See 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 288 (1999) (“[U]nder Brady an inadvertent nondisclosure has the 
same impact on the fairness of the proceedings as deliberate concealment.”); United States v. Agurs, 
427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (“Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral 
culpability, or the willfulness, of the prosecutor.  If evidence highly probative of innocence is in his 
file, he should be presumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually overlooked it.”). 
20  See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533 (2010); 
Alafair S. Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2132 (2010); Bruce A. Green, 
Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn 
from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2163–65 (2010); Alafair S. Burke, 
Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 513 (2009); Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal 
Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 541, 569. 
21  See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 367 F.3d 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that 
officer testified that it was “‘very common’ for victims of domestic abuse initially to deny that they 
had been assaulted” and reviewing cases noting that victims “may fear that by complaining to police, 
he or she might expose himself or herself to likely future harm at the hands of a hostile aggressor who 
may remain unrestrained by the law.”). 
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perpetrator.  Because prosecutors may be completely convinced of the husband’s 
guilt, they might not recognize that the wife’s initial denial that the husband hit her 
is Brady material that must be disclosed to the defense.  This scenario and others 
like it is common because misdemeanors and low-level felonies are often handled 
by junior prosecutors with only a few months or years of experience under their 
belts.22 
Additionally, we must recognize that law schools typically do an inadequate 
job of training future lawyers about Brady situations they will likely encounter,23 
and instead focus on dry legal language about how to define materiality.24  The ethics 
rules also do an inadequate job of helping prosecutors to avoid misconduct.25  Nor 
do all district attorneys’ offices do a capable job of training their prosecutors about 
Brady obligations.26  And to top it off, consider that the average prosecutor is 
extremely overburdened and is rushing through more cases than she can carefully 
handle.27  The result is not just flagrant Brady violations by unethical prosecutors, 
but also accidental violations by well-meaning prosecutors who are inadequately 
trained and overburdened. 
In short, as Professor Gershman explained in 2010, “a large and growing body 
of empirical and anecdotal evidence exists suggesting that Brady violations are the 
most common type of prosecutorial misconduct” in all criminal cases.28 
III. HOW DO WE TALK ABOUT PROSECUTORS AND BRADY VIOLATIONS?
After recognizing that we have a lot of Brady violations, the next question to 
ask is how do we talk about those violations.  The traditional approach taken by 
22  See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 8, at 271. 
23  The Supreme Court’s suggestion in Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 64–66 (2011), that 
attorneys receive adequate training for the Brady doctrine in law school and through their own efforts 
at continuing education is simply not correct. 
24  For a thoughtful discussion of how clinicians can teach beyond the black letter law and bring 
Brady cases to life, see Lara A. Bazelon, Hard Lessons: The Role of Law Schools in Addressing 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 391, 415–18 (2011). 
25  See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful 
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399. 
26  See Bennett L. Gershman, Educating Prosecutors and Supreme Court Justices About Brady 
v. Maryland, 13 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 517, 521 (2012) (describing the lack of training in the New Orleans
District Attorney’s Office that gave rise to Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011)).
27  See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 8. 
28  Bennett L. Gershman, Bad Faith Exception to Prosecutorial Immunity for Brady Violations, 
HARV. C-R-C.L. L. REV., AMICUS (2010), http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/Gershman_Publish.pdf; see also Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 4, at 52 
(“[T]here has been increased acceptance of the argument that prosecutorial misconduct is widespread 
and systemic . . . .”). 
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academics and reformers is what Professor Alafair Burke has termed a language of 
fault.  As Professor Burke has explained: 
[T]he literature on prosecutorial decision-making is dominated by a
language of fault.  When examining the ways that prosecutorial decisions
contribute to wrongful convictions, scholars and commentators have
generally attributed bad prosecutorial decisions to widespread
prosecutorial “misconduct” that is symptomatic of a deeply flawed
prosecutorial culture. . . .
The language of fault similarly permeates the discourse surrounding 
the discussion of prosecutorial disclosure of evidence to the defense. 
Advocates of expanded discovery rights for defendants portray 
prosecutors as valuing conviction rates over justice.  Motivated by the 
accolades, bragging rights, and future career advancements that come with 
high win-loss records, the prosecutors described in much of the traditional 
Brady literature intentionally, knowingly, or at least recklessly withhold 
potentially exculpatory evidence, playing “games” with a doctrine that 
allows them to maximize their conviction rates [my] [sic] gambling with 
justice.  From this perspective, a critical flaw in Brady is the doctrine’s 
entrustment of the disclosure process to wily prosecutors who rationally 
conclude that they can withhold exculpatory evidence with impunity 
because the odds favor them at every stage of the process.29 
Many scholars have embraced the language of fault, some of them quite 
unabashedly.  For instance, Professor Abbe Smith describes a “prosecutor 
personality”30 and tells stories of “smugness, self-importance, and lack of 
imagination” in describing “how many prosecutors think.”31  Professor Smith 
suggests full-throated criticism of prosecutors is appropriate because it is not “wrong 
to find fault where there has been some.”32  Other critics, while less overt, 
nevertheless seem to paint prosecutors with a broad brush of fault. For instance, 
then-Judge Alex Kozinski (before resigning in scandal) suggested that prosecutors 
29  Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, supra note 20, at 2127–28. 
30  Abbe Smith, Are Prosecutors Born or Made?, 25 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 943, 955 (2012). 
31  Id. at 949. 
32  Id. at 958 n.88.  Professor Smith asserts that “prosecutors bear some responsibility for mass 
incarceration, an obscene condition of American life that we will one day look back on in shame.”  Id. 
at 952.  For present purposes, I am not interested in the question of whether prosecutors are culpable 
for contributing to mass imprisonment.  Instead, I am interested in the more practical question of 
whether the language we use to talk about prosecutors is impeding our ability to effectuate needed 
reforms. 
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as a group do not play fair.33  In a recent and high-profile book, Professor John Pfaff 
laid the blame for mass incarceration at the feet of prosecutors.34 
Increasingly, however, academics are looking at the problem somewhat 
differently.  Professor Burke advocates for less fault-based rhetoric in discussing 
Brady violations, wrongful convictions, and other criminal justice system flaws.35 
Professor Susan Bandes has likewise embraced the idea that we should direct our 
attention to the ethical prosecutors who act in good-faith “because the focus on fault 
and blame is in many respects counterproductive.”36  And in critiquing Professor 
Pfaff’s book, my colleague Jeffrey Bellin has colorfully rejected the idea that 
“[p]rosecutors are the Darth Vader of academic writing: mysterious, powerful and, 
for the most part, bad.”37 
Although cases of flagrant prosecutorial misconduct do call for aggressive 
condemnation, I want to add my voice to the view that the language of fault can 
sometimes be counterproductive.  In particular, when trying to convince ethical 
prosecutors to recognize the existence of Brady violations around the country, a 
fault-based rhetoric may be counterproductive.  As described in Part IV below, 
prosecutors are likely susceptible to social identity theory and ingroup bias.  These 
psychological phenomena make it difficult for prosecutors to accept that their 
colleagues have committed misconduct.  And this problem is likely only exacerbated 
by aggressive criticism of prosecutors as a group. 
IV. PROSECUTORS ARE LIKELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO INGROUP BIAS
Legal scholars have increasingly turned to social science literature in an effort 
to understand some of the problems with prosecutorial decision-making.  For 
instance, in their influential article, Professors Keith Findley and Michael Scott 
showed how well-meaning prosecutors can develop tunnel vision about defendants’ 
guilt because of confirmation bias, hindsight bias, and outcome bias.38  Professor 
Alafair Burke has written widely about how prosecutors’ exercise of discretion is 
affected by cognitive bias, selective information processing, belief perseverance, 
33  See Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, viii 
(2015). 
34  See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION AND HOW TO 
ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017). 
35  See Burke, Talking About Prosecutors, supra note 20. 
36  Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW.
L.J. 475, 485 (2006); see also Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 1275, 1328 (1999).
37  Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 837 (2018). 
38  See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291. 
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and the avoidance of cognitive dissonance.39  These scholars demonstrate how 
cognition problems and tunnel vision adversely affect investigation, charging 
decisions and Brady disclosures, and cause incorrectly sticky presumptions of guilt 
both before and after trial.40  In short, social science helps to explain how ethical 
prosecutors face psychological obstacles in handling specific criminal cases. 
Social science can also help explain why ethical prosecutors may fail to 
recognize that their profession has a Brady problem.  Psychologists have long 
recognized the related concepts of social identity theory and ingroup bias.  Under 
social identity theory, people derive part of their identity and self-esteem from 
membership in social groups.41  The way we think of ourselves is determined by 
group characteristics that are immutable (for instance, nationality, gender, and race) 
as well as from chosen group memberships such as political parties, sports teams, or 
professional affiliations.42  The concept of ingroup bias provides that when someone 
from a group is accused of misconduct, other members of that group are 
psychologically less able to recognize that their colleague may have engaged in 
misconduct. As one group of psychologists has explained: 
People prefer their ingroup to an outgroup, they interpret more leniently 
an ambiguous behavior performed by an ingroup member than by an 
outgroup member, they excuse more readily antinormative behaviors 
committed by an ingrouper than by an outgrouper, they perceive bias in 
neutral reports of their conflict with an outgroup, they attribute more 
positive attributes to the ingroup than to the outgroup, and so on.43 
A key part of social identity theory and ingroup bias is the salience with which 
the individual identifies with the group.  If an individual makes identity in a 
particular group especially important to them, they are even more prone to ingroup 
39  See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive 
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006); Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive 
Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 183 (2007); Alafair S. Burke, Commentary, Brady’s 
Brainteaser: The Accidental Prosecutor and Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 575 (2007). 
40  See Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making, supra note 39, at 1603–13; Findley 
& Scott, supra note 38, at 307–22.  Of course, there are other factors beyond psychology that cause 
prosecutors to resist viable claims of innocence.  See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial 
Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004) (considering, inter 
alia, institutional culture and politics). 
41  See, e.g., Sabine Otten & Ernestine H. Gordijn, Was It One of Us? How People Cope with 
Misconduct by Fellow Ingroup Members, 8 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 165, 166 (2014). 
42  See id. 
43  Jacques-Philippe Leyens et al., The Emotional Side of Prejudice: The Attribution of 
Secondary Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 186, 187 
(2000) (citations omitted). 
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bias.44  Social science research also indicates that “ingroup favouring responses are 
expressed more strongly when the group’s identity is threatened.”45 
There are a variety of related psychological explanations for discounting 
misconduct by ingroup members.  Some researchers have posited that “people not 
only have a conception of who they are as individuals but also derive part of their 
self-image from the social groups to which they belong.”46  Under that theory, 
association with a group creates a sense of identity and increases self-esteem.47  As 
a result, psychologists have demonstrated that people tend to attribute more uniquely 
human characteristics to their ingroup than to outgroups.48  Other researchers have 
observed: 
People are more likely to refuse incorporation of negative elements into 
their group’s collective identity in order to maintain a positive group (self) 
image . . . . Consequently, group members might engage in denial of their 
group’s negative behavior, legitimization of their ingroup’s actions or 
simply claim that the ‘current’ ingroup is not the one that committed those 
horrible things.49 
A diverse set of examples help to illustrate social identity theory and ingroup 
bias in practice.  Sports is the most obvious starting point.  In sporting events, fans 
are less likely to see fouls and misconduct by their own team.  At the same time, 
they are likely to interpret behavior by the other team (the outgroup) as misconduct. 
44  See Bertjan Doosje et al., Guilty by Association: When One’s Group Has a Negative History, 
75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 872 & 885 (1998) (describing the hostile reaction of Germans 
to Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s book, Hitler’s Willing Executioners, and explaining that “for those people 
whose German identity is relatively important, defensive behavior is a more likely means of dealing 
with their nation’s unfavorable past”); Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future 
of an Identity Theory, 63 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 284 (2000) (discussing identity salience). 
45  Paul Hutchison & Dominic Abrams, Ingroup Identification Moderates Stereotype Change in 
Reaction to Ingroup Deviance, 33 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 497, 498 (2003); see also Nyla R. 
Branscombe & Daniel L. Wann, Collective Self-Esteem Consequences of Outgroup Derogation When 
a Valued Social Identity Is on Trial, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 641 (1994). 
46  Bertjan Doosje et al., supra note 44, at 873. 
47  See id. 
48  See Jacques-Philippe Leyens et al., Psychological Essentialism and the Differential 
Attribution of Uniquely Human Emotions to Ingroups and Outgroups, 31 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 395 
(2001). 
49  Sabina Čehajić et al., What Do I Care? Perceived Ingroup Responsibility and 
Dehumanization as Predictors of Empathy Felt for the Victim Group, 12 GROUP PROCESS &
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 715, 717 (2009) (citations omitted); see also Michael J.A. Wohl et al., 
Collective Guilt: Emotional Reactions When One’s Group Has Done Wrong or Been Wronged, 17 
EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (2006) (“According to social identity theory, people are motivated to 
perceive their ingroup positively.”) (citations omitted). 
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In a famous study of a rough, injury-filled 1951 football game between Princeton 
and Dartmouth, fans of each team thought the other side had engaged in more 
flagrant misconduct.50 
Modern sports fans are also quick to discount the misconduct of their team and 
its players.  For instance, Baltimore Ravens fans were able to minimize the 
significance of domestic violence charges against star player, Ray Rice, after a video 
surfaced of him punching his wife in an elevator.51  During the DeflateGate 
controversy, New England Patriots fans were far less likely to believe their star 
quarterback, Tom Brady, had broken the rules by using intentionally deflated 
footballs during the AFC championship.  In a survey conducted by the New York 
Times, only 16% of Patriots fans believed Brady had broken the rules, compared 
with 67% of fans of other teams.52  Numerous other studies show ingroup favoritism 
and bias in the sports context.53 
Children exhibit ingroup bias as well.  Psychologists’ studies of children have 
found that they are more forgiving and more forgetful of bad behavior by children 
in their group.54  For instance, in a study of Euro-Canadian and Native-Canadian 
elementary school children, researchers showed pictures of groups of children and 
told them about positive and negative behaviors.55  The Euro-Canadian children 
recalled more positive and fewer negative behaviors about children from their 
ingroup.56  Those same children recalled more negative and fewer positive behaviors 
about children in the other group.57  Researchers found the same results with the 
Native-Canadian children.  In short, children saw less negative behavior in the 
ingroup and more negative behavior in their outgroup. 
50  See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954). 
51  For a video of fan reactions, see The Ladies of Ravens Nation on Ray Rice, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posttv/sports/the-ladies-of-ravens-nation-on-ray-
rice/2014/09/12/4d39ab5a-3a67-11e4-a023-1d61f7f31a05_video.html?utm_term=.1f237cd9676f. 
52  See Brendan Nyhan, Tom Brady and Political Beliefs: It Depends What Team You’re On, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2015. 
53  See, e.g., Daniel L. Wann et al., The Impact of Team Identification on Biased Predictions of 
Player Performance, 56 PSYCHOL. RECORD 55 (2006); Daniel L. Wann & Frederick G. Grieve, Biased 
Evaluations of In-Group and Out-Group Spectator Behavior at Sporting Events: The Importance of 
Team Identification and Threats to Social Identity, 145 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 531 (2005). 
54  See Antonia Misch et al., The Whistleblower’s Dilemma in Young Children: When Loyalty 
Trumps Other Moral Concerns, 9 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 250 (2018). 
55  See Brandon Corenblum, What Children Remember About Ingroup and Outgroup Peers: 
Effects of Stereotypes on Children’s Processing of Information About Group Members, 86 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 32 (2003). 
56  See id. at 42. 
57  Id. 
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There is also evidence of ingroup bias with respect to race.  In the infamous 
O.J. Simpson case, the reaction to Simpson’s acquittal diverged on racial lines.  A 
substantial majority of Black observers cheered the decision, while a majority of 
White observers believed Simpson escaped justice.58  Social identity theory helps to 
explain that divergence.  Black Americans, as a group, tend to distrust the criminal 
justice system.59  They could see Simpson as a member of their ingroup who was 
unfairly targeted by an outgroup of White law enforcement agents seeking to set him 
up.60  Researchers have found similar dynamics in laboratory studies based on race, 
gender, and nationality.61 
Scholars have also identified ingroup bias in perceptions of violence between 
religious groups.  In one study, researchers showed both Catholics and Protestants 
from Northern Ireland video footage of violence instigated by each group.62  Both 
the Protestant and Catholic respondents were more willing to downplay violence 
initiated by their own group.  In both cohorts, group members were “two-and-a-half 
to four times more likely to attribute violence to external rather than internal 
causation.”63 
And then, of course, there is politics.  It should not be shocking that people who 
identify with a political party are less likely to find blame or misconduct by members 
of their own party.  To take a recent and high-profile example, consider reaction to 
Robert Mueller’s investigation into whether the Trump campaign colluded with 
Russia during the 2016 election.  A poll taken at the end of 2017 found that 52% of 
respondents believed there had been election collusion, in contrast to 13% for 
Republican voters.64 
The same dynamic was at play when allegations arose that President Clinton 
had an extramarital affair with Monica Lewinsky.  The scandal first broke in January 
1998 and President Clinton continued to deny the relationship into the summer of 
58  See Victoria Kuhl, Disparities in Judgments of the O.J. Simpson Case: A Social Identity 
Perspective, 53 J. SOCIAL ISSUES 531 (1997). 
59  See, e.g., ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014). 
60  See Kuhl, supra note 58, at 541–42. 
61  See Miles Hewstone, The ‘Ultimate Attribution Error’? A Review of the Literature on 
Intergroup Causal Attribution, 20 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1990) (reviewing numerous studies, 
though cautioning against over-reading the evidence). 
62  See J.A. Hunter et al., Intergroup Violence and Intergroup Attributions, 30 BRIT. J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 261 (1991). 
63  See id. at 264. 
64  See Brennan Weiss, Poll: Majority of Trump Voters Would Support Him Even if He Colluded 
with Russia, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-voters-
support-him-even-he-colluded-with-russia-2017-12. 
2019] THE CHALLENGE OF CONVINCING ETHICAL PROSECUTORS 319 
1998.65  As of early August 1998, a majority of the public and nearly 70% of 
Republicans believed that Clinton had not only had an affair but had also attempted 
to have Lewinsky cover it up.66  By contrast, a far smaller percentage of Democrats 
—less than 30%—believed the allegations.67  According to polling data from just 
before impeachment proceedings began: 
The public divides sharply along partisan lines over who they believe 
more—Clinton or Lewinsky.  Two-thirds of Republicans (66%) said they 
would believe Lewinsky if she and Clinton offer different accounts of their 
relationship, while 64% of Democrats said they would believe Clinton. 
Among those who believe Clinton more than Lewinsky, most (57%) 
would not be swayed even if Lewinsky provided new evidence, such as 
tape recorded messages from her answering machine or personal gifts 
from Clinton.68 
Ignoring negative evidence based on political party goes well beyond the 
Trump and Clinton scandals.  Politically-involved individuals even tune out news 
coverage that does not comport with the views of their political or ideological 
group.69 
From sports to children to politics to O.J. Simpson to war in Northern Ireland, 
social scientists have shown ingroup bias in action.  Perfectly normal, ethical people 
are less willing to recognize improper behavior when it involves someone in their 
group.  Should this same logic apply to prosecutors?  Although there is a surprisingly 
small literature about ingroup behavior and lawyers,70 there is reason to believe 
prosecutors would likewise be susceptible to ingroup bias.71 
65  Peter Baker & John F. Harris, Clinton Admits to Lewinsky Relationship, Challenges Starr to 
End Personal ‘Prying,’ WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 1998, at A01. 
66  See Americans Unmoved By Prospect of Clinton, Lewinsky Testimony, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Aug. 4, 1998), http://www.people-press.org/1998/08/04/americans-unmoved-by-prospect-of-
clinton-lewinsky-testimony/. 
67  See id. 
68  Id. 
69  See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned the 
Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 328. 
70  For a discussion of the limited research on lawyers, see Cassandra Burke Robertson, 
Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1, 12–16 (2009) (discussing Hugh Gunz & 
Sally Gunz, Hired Professional to Hired Gun: An Identity Theory Approach to Understanding the 
Ethical Behaviour of Professionals in Non-Professional Organizations, 60 HUM. REL. 851, 859 
(2007)). 
71  See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing and Plea 
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 181 (2007) (explaining that group membership and bias could 
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Serving in the trenches together gives prosecutors a distinct identity.  They are 
on the team that is “doing justice” and “locking up the bad guys.”72  As the late 
Professor Andrew Taslitz explained, prosecutors “want to paint a flattering portrait 
of the organization with which they identify.”73  And for many prosecutors who work 
long hours side-by-side with their colleagues,74 it is likely a salient identification.75 
To the extent prosecutors see themselves as “doing justice” by “taking the bad 
guys off the streets,” they are the ingroup to be contrasted with various outgroups—
think of public defenders and the defendants themselves—whom the prosecutorial 
group see as adverse players.  Finally, prosecutors can see their identity (doing 
justice and serving the good guys) as threatened when the news media and academics 
point out instances of prosecutorial misconduct.  As noted in Part II above, there has 
been considerable reporting and scholarship identifying both individual and 
systemic cases of prosecutorial misconduct in recent decades.76 
Now circle back to what the social science literature tells us: a cohesive ingroup 
that perceives itself as under attack from various outgroups provides a recipe for 
ingroup bias.77  It should therefore seem quite plausible that prosecutors might have 
trouble recognizing or acknowledging Brady violations.  This does not mean these 
prosecutors, as a group, are unethical.  It does not mean that prosecutors are 
indifferent to misconduct or that they condone Brady violations.  It means that 
ethical prosecutors, as a group, are more susceptible to psychological error because 
ingroup bias alters their perceptions.78  Prosecutors are, therefore, more prone to 
under-diagnose the Brady problems around them. 
affect plea bargaining and that “lawyers may not be paradigms of rational actors in the plea bargaining 
context.”). 
72  See Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Images and Allusions in Prosecutors’ Morality 
Tales, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 38, 43 (2017) (“Our interviewees often explained their commitment to the job 
or described prosecution itself in terms of ‘wearing the white hat.’ The white hat is, at its most basic 
level, a metaphor for the prosecutor's identity as the good guy in the criminal justice system.”). 
73  Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not To Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense Counsel Overcome 
Pervasive Status Quo Bias in the Criminal Justice System?, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 315, 363 (2012). 
74  See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 8. 
75  Many prosecutors strongly identify with their group.  See, e.g., Levine & Wright, supra note 
72, at 48–53 (recounting how some prosecutors label colleagues as “traitors” or turning to the “dark 
side” if they leave to become defense attorneys). 
76  The work of Bennett Gershman alone is voluminous.  See BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (1999); BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, CRIMINAL TRIAL ERROR AND
MISCONDUCT (2015); see also supra Part II. 
77  See supra notes 43–68 and accompanying text. 
78  In some circumstances however, researchers have found a “black sheep effect.”  To maintain 
a positive view of the group, members react very harshly to the ingroup member who committed 
misconduct in order to demonstrate that the deviant’s behavior is not consistent with the norms of the 
group.  See Otten & Gordijn, supra note 41, at 167 (citing J. Marques & V. Y. Yzerbyt, The Black 
Sheep Effect: Judgmental Extremity Toward Ingroup Members in Inter- and Intra-Group Situations, 
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V. CONVINCING ETHICAL PROSECUTORS THERE IS A BRADY PROBLEM
How then do we convince ethical prosecutors that their colleagues have 
violated Brady v. Maryland?  There is no magic solution, but there are a few 
possibilities that may help: (1) Brady training that is specifically designed to 
overcome cognitive bias; (2) a greater academic focus on inadvertent Brady 
violations that steps back from the “us versus them” approach; and (3) continued 
efforts to humanize the victims of Brady violations. 
A. Training
Numerous scholars have advocated increased Brady training.79  Professor
Gershman’s approach is particularly instructive.  In a 2012 article, Professor 
Gershman laid out a Brady Training Program with a course syllabus.80  His 
framework includes all of the key legal issues that criminal procedure professors 
would cover in a traditional law school class, while also encouraging lawyers to look 
beyond the Supreme Court and consider local rules, professional norms, and 
governing ethics rules.81  Even more importantly, Professor Gershman’s framework 
includes ten hypothetical questions that a facilitator can use to help prosecutors 
analyze real-world situations, rather than just a list of legal rules.82 
In addition to teaching legal rules and reviewing real-world problems, Brady 
training should also alert prosecutors to cognitive biases that might affect them.  As 
Professor Alafair Burke has explained, “[a]lthough research on debiasing suggests 
that awareness of cognitive biases is no panacea for perfect rationality, some 
evidence suggests that educating people about the cognitive processes that cause 
bias can improve the quality of decision making.”83  In particular, Professor Burke 
points out that “empirical evidence demonstrates that the biasing effects of people's 
18 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 287 (1988)).  Nevertheless, research seems to indicate that “people tend to 
give ingroup members the ‘benefit of the doubt’ when intent is ambiguous but decidedly not when 
hostile intent is clear.”  Id. at 174.  In other words, “ingroup bias can be viewed as sort of a default 
reaction, operating automatically to protect ingroup positivity.”  Id. 
79  See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089 (2010); Yaroshefsky, supra note 10. 
80  See Gershman, supra note 26, at 533–49. 
81  See id. 
82  See id. at 544–49. 
83  Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L.
REV. 183, 206 (2007). 
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pre-existing beliefs are mitigated when people are forced to articulate the opposing 
perspective.”84 
B. Focusing on Accidental Brady Violations
While prosecutors are engaged in training, academics and reformers should dial
down the temperature a little and focus some of their attention on accidental rather 
than flagrant Brady violations.  A Westlaw search for accidental or inadvertent 
prosecutorial error turns up a fraction of results compared to a search for flagrant or 
intentional prosecutorial misconduct.85  Put simply, the news media, reform 
organizations, and academics devote a lot more ink to outrageous prosecutorial 
behavior than to negligent conduct.  This is obviously to be expected from the media 
because they are in the business of selling copies and logging site hits. However, 
academics and reformers should have a broader agenda. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that academics and reformers should ignore 
overt misconduct.  Prosecutors who commit intentional misconduct should be 
identified and fired, and their offices should be put in the limelight in order to 
pressure them to improve their training and hiring practices.86  But that should not 
be the only focus, particularly in a world where social identity theory and ingroup 
bias cause an “us versus them” dynamic.  In order to reach ethical prosecutors and 
convince them their colleagues are not performing adequately, the information 
campaign cannot be entirely negative.  A relentless focus on only flagrant 
prosecutorial misconduct will cause an ingroup of prosecutors—even ethical 
prosecutors—to downplay or ignore evidence in front of them.  Rather, academics 
and reformers should also highlight accidental Brady violations in an effort to make 
a less hostile appeal to ethical prosecutors. 
C. Humanizing Victims
While advocates may want to redirect their attention to accidental Brady
violations, they should stay the course with respect to the wrongful conviction 
movement.  Over the last few decades, academics and reformers have drawn 
84  Id. at 207. 
85  On July 6, 2018, a search in the secondary sources database for “inadvertent or accident! or 
negligent /5 prosecutor! /5 error or misconduct” turned up less than 100 results.  By contrast, a search 
“intentional or flagrant or purpose! or outrageous /5 prosecutor! /5 misconduct or error” returned more 
than 600 results. 
86  I have previously advocated naming and shaming those who engage in reversible Brady 
violations.  See Gershowitz, supra note 15. 
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enormous attention to those who have been wrongfully convicted.87  The innocence 
movement is credited not only with freeing the wrongly convicted, but also with 
contributing to the decline in the death penalty,88 enhancing DNA testing, improving 
police investigation procedures, and increasing funding for indigent defense.89  This 
focus on the suffering of victims—as opposed to the misconduct of prosecutors—
could prove beneficial in fighting ingroup bias and convincing ethical prosecutors 
to recognize their profession has a Brady problem. 
In studying mass atrocities, psychologists have found that dehumanization of 
the victims allows the ingroup to psychologically reject full responsibility and 
engage in moral disengagement.90  By contrast, perceiving another person as human 
activates empathetic reactions.91  To the extent, academics and reformers can tell the 
story of those who have suffered Brady violations and humanize them, it may serve 
to reduce prosecutorial indifference to the Brady problem. 
VI. CONCLUSION
There are tens of thousands of ethical prosecutors across the United States.92 
At the same time, there are widespread Brady violations across the country.  In some 
cases, prosecutors have engaged in flagrant misconduct, but more often Brady 
violations are probably accidental.  This should not be surprising given that many 
prosecutors receive minimal Brady training and carry heavy caseloads.  Yet, 
prosecutors—including ethical prosecutors—seem to resist the idea that their 
profession has a Brady problem. 
Social identity theory and ingroup bias may help to explain why prosecutors 
downplay the Brady problem.  Prosecutors likely identify strongly with their 
colleagues and constitute a salient social group.  In turn, psychological research 
teaches us that when someone from the group is accused of misconduct, members 
87  See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); HUGO ADAM BEDAU ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS
CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1994). 
88  The story, however, is more complicated than simply a change in public opinion because of 
exonerations.  See Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death Penalty, 105 
GEO. L.J. 661 (2017); Michael L. Radelet, The Role of the Innocence Argument in Contemporary Death 
Penalty Debates, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 199 (2008). 
89  See Lara A. Bazelon, The Long Goodbye: After the Innocence Movement, Does the Attorney-
Client Relationship Ever End?, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 681, 699–700 (2016). 
90  See Emanuele Castano & Roger Giner-Sorolla, Not Quite Human: Infrahumanization in 
Response to Collective Responsibility for Intergroup Killing, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 804, 
805 (2006). 
91  See id.; see also Jodi Halpern & Harvey M. Weinstein, Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy 
and Reconciliation, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 561 (2004). 
92  See U.S. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 Tbl. 2 (2011). 
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of the ingroup are psychologically less able to recognize or accept that a group 
member has committed the misconduct.  Social scientists have documented this 
phenomenon in children, sports fans, Democrats, Republicans, racial groups, and 
warring religious factions.  Prosecutors should be no different. 
While academics and advocacy groups should be commended for identifying 
Brady violations and advocating for change, the often-used language of fault may 
contribute to ethical prosecutors downplaying the scope of the Brady problem. 
Accordingly, academics and advocates should broaden their focus to hone in on not 
just flagrant prosecutorial misconduct, but also accidental Brady violations.  In 
addition, we should continue to focus on wrongful convictions to humanize the 
victims of Brady violations.  Finally, law schools and district attorneys’ offices must 
do better on training prosecutors to recognize Brady material and disclose it.  These 
modest steps will not be a panacea, but they should help ethical prosecutors to 
recognize that their profession has a Brady problem.  That recognition, in turn, can 
continue to move us in the right direction of stamping out both flagrant and 
accidental Brady violations. 
